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Abstract 
The issue of disruptive operators has recently gained interest among researchers and 
regulators. From a regulator’s perspective, disruptive operators can increase competitive 
rivalry in markets dominated by a handful of large companies, thus allowing consumers to 
obtain more benefits in terms of price and quality. However, the “disruptive” qualification of 
an operator in related studies does not rely on a precise definition of disruption.  The 
disruption theory, as developed by Christensen, provides such a definition but may be too 
restrictive. In addition, it may not be adapted to the analysis of disruption in regulated 
industries such as telecommunications. In this paper, we aim at deepening our understanding 
of disruption in the case of the Telecommunications industry, by analysing cases of mobile 
operators who entered the industry thanks to 3G or 4G licences. To this end we first analyse 
the disruption theory literature and highlight its characteristics and limitations. It allows us to 
propose an eclectic analytical framework of disruptive innovations that does not restrict to 
Christensen’s theory. We then apply it to different cases of disruptive mobile operators in 
order to identify the level and pattern of disruption inherent to each case, and to compare 
them. We conclude by discussing our findings and further research perspectives. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of disruptive operators has recently gained interest among researchers and 
regulators. From a regulator’s perspective, disruptive operators can increase competitive 
rivalry in markets dominated by a handful of large companies, thus allowing consumers to 
obtain more benefits in terms of price and quality. In 2016, Ofcom, the UK’s 
telecommunications regulatory, published a cross-country economic study that analysed the 
impact on prices of the presence of disruptive operators, finding that where disruptive mobile 
operators are present prices are lower in the order of between 10.7% and 12.4% compared to 
countries where there are no disruptive operators (Ofcom, 2016). Other authors have focused 
on specific markets and companies in order to provide a fine-grain analysis of disruption. For 
example, Berne, Vialle and Whalley (2016) show that the introduction of Free Mobile in 
France had a strong impact in terms of prices, profits, market shares, market growth, 
employment and market structure. They suggest that such a notable and wide-ranging effect 
results from the disruptive business model adopted by Free Mobile and may not have been 
possible if the new entrant was a ‘traditional’ competitor. On a more general level, there has 
been also recently a renewal of the debate on disruptive innovation (i.e., Christensen, 2015; 
Hagel et al, 2015; King and Baatartogtokh (2015); Weeks, 2015). 
Ofcom (2016) has adopted a rather pragmatic attitude when defining disruption. They 
argue that there is no precise definition of ‘disruption’ but identifies three broad categories of 
behaviour that a company may display. It may introduce a product or service that supersedes 
existing ones, or produce an existing product or services differently using new technologies. 
The company can also show ‘aggressive behaviour’, such as through competing aggressively 
and prioritising gains in market share over profitability.  
There are, however, diverging perspectives among authors on how to define 
disruption, by putting the emphasis on the process or on the outcome. For the main 
stakeholder of this theory, clayton Christensen, disruption is defined as a process with precise 
characteristics, through which a smaller competitor with limited resources is able to 
successfully challenge established incumbent businesses (i.e. Christensen, 1997). As 
Christensen (2015) highlights: “success is not built into the definition of disruption: Not every 
disruptive path leads to a triumph, and not every triumphant newcomer follows a disruptive 
path”. Disruption cannot be only defined by an outcome, such as gaining a significant market 
share; it has to exhibit a particular pattern of evolution over time. Would-be disrupters start 
with a foothold on low-end or new markets that are neglected by incumbents, but can only 
become true disrupters after they improve their products and services and move upmarket to 
further compete with incumbents. 
Despite its obvious merits, the definition and patterns defined by Christensen seem to 
be quite restrictive and may not be encompassing enough to account for every kind of 
disruptive behaviours.Other authors have adopted an outcome-based perspective. For 
example, Hagel et al. (2015) analyse several cases in which incumbents have been 
significantly displaced, and identify patterns that not necessarily complying with 
Christensen’s theory. Christensen’s theory also does not explicitly consider the influence of 
external factors, such as country or industry characteristics; or internal (firm-specific) factors; 
such as resources and competences. 
In this paper, we aim at deepening our understanding of disruption in the case of the 
Telecommunications industry, by analysing cases of mobile operators who entered the 
industry thanks to 3G or 4G licences. To this end we first analyse the disruption theory 
literature and highlight its characteristics and limitations. It allows us to propose an eclectic 
analytical framework of disruptive innovations that does not restrict to Christensen’s theory. 
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We then apply it to different cases of disruptive mobile operators in order to identify the level 
and pattern of disruption inherent to each case, and to compare them. We conclude by 
discussing our findings and further research perspectives. 
2. Definition of an eclectic analytical framework of disruption 
2.1 Definition and evolution of the disruptive innovation theory 
The disruptive innovation (DI) theory has been developed as a quasi-exclusivity of Clayton 
Christensen and his co-authors. A few other authors have reviewed his work and raised some 
critics of the theory, others have brought complementary contributions, or have even departed 
from the initial theory. In this review we explain the main features of the DI theory and raise a 
few issues that allow us to elaborate a broader way to analyze disruptive innovation. 
Initial conceptualization 
The main intent of the DI theory is to explain why incumbent firms fail to respond 
accordingly when confronted with innovations introduced by new entrants. It provides a 
different perspective from previous contributions on the same topic, such as the notion of 
architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990), or the distinction between competence-
destroying technologies and competence enhancing technologies by Tushman and Anderson 
(1986)). It must be kept in mind that Christensen’s theory is about competitive behavior 
(response) and is market-based (incumbents behave according to their perception of 
mainstream customers’ expectations, rather than according to their resources and 
competences). 
The initial conceptualization of disruption theory is based on the PhD thesis of 
Christensen and exposed in a few seminal articles (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen 
and Bower, 1996; Rosenblum and Christensen, 1995)) and in his book: The innovator’s 
dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms to fail (1997). This conceptualization was 
based on the in-depth analysis of the disk-drive industry and examples from several other 
markets.  
In his book, Christensen (1997) asks why established incumbents fail to respond to the 
threat of new entrants introducing disruptive technologies and are eventually displaced by 
them. His explanations are based on the distinction between sustaining and disruptive 
technologies. Sustaining technologies improve “established products, along the dimensions of 
performance that mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued” 
(Christensen, 1997, p. XV), while disruptive technologies improve products on dimensions 
that are different from the ones valued by mainstream customers. They initially underperform 
on these latter dimensions, compared to sustaining technologies, but become disruptive after 
they improve and match the preferences of the main markets. 
The pattern of disruption is the following: a new entrant introduces a new technology 
that has a lower performance than the established technology on the dimensions historically 
valued by mainstream customers in the core markets, but has a better performance on other 
dimensions. The products based on this innovation are “typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, 
and, frequently, more convenient to use” (Christensen, 1997, p.XV). They are introduced in 
over-served low-end markets which have lower performance expectations on the main 
dimension and also value other dimensions.  These low-end, least profitable customers are 
satisfied by a good enough product which is not expensive. Incumbents rationally choose to 
ignore this competition, focus on the most attractive and profitable markets, and invest in 
improving the performance of the dominant technology in order to satisfy the most 
demanding customers. After its introduction, the new technology will mature in fringe 
markets and improve its performance on the dimensions valued by the main markets. As the 
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performance of the dominant technology also improved, there is still a performance gap 
between the two technologies. However, the performance of the mainstream technology may 
exceed the needs of most customers, so the new technology only needs to meet the level of 
performance required by the mainstream market.  When the new technology meets this level 
of performance, it displaces the dominant technology and the new entrant displaces 
incumbents. 
Theory extension 
In a second book, The innovator’s solution, Christensen and Raynor (2003) refine and extend 
the theory. Firstly, they address the issue of how incumbents can avoid being displaced by 
developing themselves disrupting technologies. They recommend, among others, to create 
separate organizational units to manage disruptive technologies, as IBM did with personal 
computers. Secondly, they extend the scope of the theory beyond technological innovations to 
all kind of business model innovations:  discount department stores; low-cost airlines; 
products such as copiers, and motorcycles; and various online businesses such as bookselling, 
education, and travel agents. Thirdly, they distinguish between low end disruptions and new 
market disruptions. Low end disruptive innovations initially targets current customers with 
low price and lower performance. New market disruptive innovations instead target markets 
that are not served by incumbents by offering higher performance on other dimensions and 
create a new value network (and are not necessarily cheaper. In an interview, Christensen 
cites another type of innovation, efficiency innovations: “The third type of innovation,” says 
Christensen, “which we missed in earlier versions of disruption theory, are efficiency 
innovations. The purpose of efficiency innovations is to do more with less” (Denning, 2016, 
p.). 
It is important to highlight some key elements of the theory. (1) it is based on the 
existence of performance improvement curve and the fact that the sustaining technology’s 
performance will eventually exceed customers’ needs. (2) disruption is a process showing a 
particular pattern of evolution: disruptive companies start operating in low-end or marginal 
markets and progressively move upmarket in order to ultimately displace incumbents.  (3) it 
outlines that managers in incumbent companies behave rationally by applying what they have 
learned in Business Schools and concentrate on the most profitable markets. By abandoning 
low-end markets to disruptive competitors, they may even get a sense of appropriateness as 
profitability may likely improve on short-term. (4) in this process, the incumbents are nearly 
always dethroned. (5) there is a view that incumbents can only fight disruptive innovations by 
adopting themselves these innovations. 
2.2 Critics of the DI theory 
Christensen’s work has raised several critics that are related to three main issues: the scientific 
validity of the theory; its explanation and predictive power; and the definition of concepts. 
A criticized methodology and assessment process  
The methodology by which Christensen has designed his theory has been highly criticized. In 
particular, he has been accused of using “hand-picked” case studies (Cohan, 2000; Lepore, 
2014; Tellis, 2006). Cohan notes that the cases used are only cases in which the disruptive 
technology di succeed and that Christensen did not consider cases in which they failed.  
Lepore (2014) even seems to challenge the integrity of Christensen by accusing him of hand-
picking case studies and also criticized his analysis of these cases.  She notes that the choice 
of the disk-drive industry, which Christensen himself describes as incomparable, makes an 
odd choice for an investigation aiming to design a model applicable to other industries. She 
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also observes that the outcomes of its main case study could be considered differently by 
adopting a longer time frame. 
Tellis (2006) is more moderate and admits that Christensen’s sampling is acceptable 
for building a theory. Chesbrough (2001) also remarks that this theory focused more on 
internal validity than external validity, and that it may be context dependent as all cases were 
based in the USA. Most empirical work has been in the form of very well-documented and 
thorough case studies of particular industries, but the extent to which findings from these case 
studies generalize across industries has not been addressed. However, according to him, it 
does not allow testing and validating the theory.  Weeks (2015) notes that anomalies 
identified in several cases by other authors have not been sufficiently addressed by 
Christensen. He also suggests that the perceived deficiencies of the theory may be caused by 
the fact that the main contributions have not been subject to peer review, as they have been 
published in books or in Harvard Business Review. Weeks (2015, p. 419)) assumes that “a 
more rigorous peer review of his methodology and of some of the disruptive innovation 
concepts may have allowed Christensen to refine the exposition of his theory more thoroughly 
through the years”. 
Poor predictive power 
The reliance on analyzing cases post hoc raises the issue of the predictive power of the theory. 
Actually, Christensen also made himself famous for his poor predictions. For example, 
Christensen predicted that the IPhone would fail (McGregor, 2007), as it was a sustaining 
technology relative to Nokia.  Lepore (2014) also relates that Christensen launched on 
March10, 2000 a “Disruptive Growth Fund” in which stocks were selected according to his 
theory. The fund actually performed less than the Nasdaq and was liquidated less than one 
year later. Weeks (2015) also questions the relevance of Christensen’s analysis of digital 
photography and of his prescriptions for Kodak. 
A theory that seems to only partially account for the cases studied 
A more problematic issue is whether the theory actually accounts for the cases that 
Christensen himself has investigated, as several authors have come to different conclusions 
from the very same cases. For example, on the disk-drive industry, which constitute one of the 
key case on which Christensen based his theory development, McKendrick, Doner, and 
Haggard (2000) challenge the conclusion drawn that most disruptive innovations have been 
introduced by new entrants and that incumbents mostly failed. Similarly, King and Tucci 
(1999) and Chesbrough (2003, analyzing the same industry) found out that established 
incumbents were more likely to introduce innovations in new niche markets, and also to 
exhibit a higher survival rate. King and Baatartogtokh (2015) reviewed 77 cases discussed by 
Christensen in his two books, by interviewing experts on the industries concerned. They 
tested four key proposition of the disruption theory and found out that they were only partly 
verified. In 24 cases ( 31% of the total), leading incumbents were not following a trajectory of 
sustaining innovation. In 60 cases (78%), sustaining innovation was not outperforming the 
mainstream customers’ expectations. In 30 cases (39%), incumbents did not have the 
capability to respond to the disruption threat. In 29 cases (38%), incumbents have not been 
displaced. Actually, the four key propositions have been verified in only 9% of the cases. 
2.3 Critics of the theoretical framework 
The main critics of the theoretical framework are the lack of precise definition of disruptive 
innovation and of its scope, the lack of a consistent unit of analysis, the lack of consideration 
for the context, and also some assumptions of the theory. 
Lack of precise definition disruptive innovation 
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A first remark is that the theory seems to be outcome-based and not outcome-based at the 
same time. The key difference between disruptive innovation and sustaining innovation is that 
the former disrupts incumbents while the later sustains incumbents. So it is in some way 
outcome-based and relative, as the same innovation can be disruptive for a given firm and 
sustaining for another one. However, according to Christensen, it is not outcome-based. 
Christensen et al. (2015) highlight: “success is not built into the definition of disruption: Not 
every disruptive path leads to a triumph, and not every triumphant newcomer follows a 
disruptive path”. Disruption cannot be only defined by an outcome, such as gaining a 
significant market share; it has to exhibit a particular pattern of evolution over time. Would-be 
disrupters start with a foothold on low-end or new markets that are neglected by incumbents, 
but can only become true disrupters after they improve their products and services and move 
upmarket to further compete with incumbents. Danneels (2004) also raises the time issue, and 
wonders at what point of time an innovation can be characterized as disruptive: once it is 
marketed or only after it disrupts incumbents?  As developed d later by Tellis (2006), that 
makes it difficult to identify ex-ante which ones, among the multiple underperforming 
innovations on the market, may become disruptive? 
Danneels (2006, p.249) proposes an interesting definition of disruptive innovation: “In 
my opinion, the core of the definition of a disruptive technology is this: A disruptive 
technology is a technology that changes the bases of competition by changing the 
performance metrics along which firms compete”. We think this definition is particularly 
relevant for our research, as it is more encompassing than the initial definition by Christensen. 
Schmidt and Druehl (2008) extend the initial distinction between low-market 
disruption and new-market disruption, and propose a more comprehensive and analytical 
framework that classify innovations according to their diffusion pattern. High end 
encroachment is a classical diffusion pattern in which a sustaining innovation starts with a 
high price for the high end market.  Low end encroachment corresponds to the progressive 
disruption pattern described in Christensen (1997). New-market disruption is divided into two 
types, fringe-market low-end encroachment (in a new market in which customers’ needs are 
incrementally different) and detached-market low-end encroachment (customers’ needs are 
dramatically different). Finally, immediate low end encroachment correspond to low end 
disruptions that start immediately to sell on the market 
Very few authors have attempted to propose an alternative conceptualisation to 
Christensen’s DI theory. A notable exception is the study by Deloitte consulting firm (Hagel 
et al., 2015). They have adopted an outcome-based perspective and empirically designed 
another conceptualisation of disruptive innovation. Hagel et al. They analyze several cases in 
which incumbents have been significantly displaced, and identify nine patterns of disruption. 
These patterns belong to two broad categories: harnessing network effects and transforming 
the value-cost equation. They also consider that disruption may differ between various 
industries according to their characteristics, and also to the trends affecting them.  
Undefined unit of analysis 
Weeks (2015), also highlights the lack of specification of the unit of analysis: “What unit of 
analysis is the research targeting? There are several choices including the technology (or 
innovation), the industry, the firm, or firm leaders. “At various times, Christensen’s work 
makes statements about each potential unit of analysis” (Weeks, pp. 421-422).  Weeks further 
comments (p. 426): “If the unit of analysis is the firm, one might consider which firms are 
more likely to be able to introduce disruptive innovations….If the industry is the unit of 
analysis, one encounters other possible questions. Are certain industries more likely to survive 
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disruptive innovations? What characteristics influence these outcomes: supplier networks; 
customer networks; rivalry; labor practices?” 
Markides (2006) observed that the theory, initially designed for technologies 
(Christensen, 1997), has been inappropriately widened to other types of innovations (i.e. 
Christensen, 2003). “A disruptive technological innovation is a fundamentally different 
phenomenon from a disruptive business- model innovation as well as a disruptive product 
innovation: These innovations arise in different ways, have different competitive effects, and 
require different responses from incumbents’ (p.). He further states that “To qualify as an 
innovation, the new business model must enlarge the existing economic pie, either by 
attracting new customers into the market or by encouraging existing customers to consume 
more….It is important to note that business model innovators do not discover new products or 
services; they simply redefine what an existing product or service is and how it is provided to 
the customer.” He stresses that while the process by which these innovations emerge and 
grow is similar to the case of technologies (i.e. performance dimensions), they are quite 
different on some aspects. In particular, a business model innovation does not usually 
eventually dominate the market for three reasons (1) the new business model may not be 
superior to the incumbent’s one, (2) the best incumbent’s response is not necessarily to adopt 
the innovation, (3) if the incumbent adopts it, it is not necessarily better to create a separate 
unit for it. 
No context contingency is considered 
Christensen’s theory does not explicitly consider the influence of external (country, industry) 
or internal (firm) factors, other than anecdotally. It can be reasonably assumed that such 
factors could well explain the observations made by other authors about cases which don’t, or 
only partially fit the disruptive theory. 
It seems that sector differences are only considered through differences in performance 
trajectories: “In some industries the trajectory of technological improvement is very steep, 
like the disk drive industry where every eight years some firm was getting eliminated. In 
others, the trajectory of improvement is gentler, like in discount retailing. And finally, in 
others, the trajectory is flat.” (Christensen, cited by Denning, 2016). 
Few articles relate disruption with external influences.  When they do, they do it 
marginally, or are not well recognized contribution.  Among the first category, Chesbrough 
(1999) found that, contrary to the USA, incumbents in the disk drive industry in Japan have 
not been disrupted. He attributes this difference to country-specific factors, such as 
regulations, culture and financing system. Weeks (2015), raises the issue of the possible 
characteristics that would make some industries more likely to be disrupted. Hagel et al 
(2015), put more emphasis on the external context: market conditions, such as product 
characteristics, demand characteristics and industry structure and catalysts, such as 
macroeconomic factors and public policy. King and Baatartogtokh (2015) found that in 40% 
of the 77 cases analysed by Christensen, changing economies of scale played a role in 
disruption as it reduced the number of players who could profitably serve the market. Yu and 
Chang (2010) raise a few issues about context and environment: the environmental 
determinants of disruptive innovation, the factors explaining why disruption happens in some 
countries rather than others, and the identification of emerging markets and of the needs of 
new customers. 
Intellectual contributions dealing mainly with external factors seem to be marginal. 
Chiaroni et al (2015) highlight the relevance of context factors by analyzing the case of Uber 
in four different cities in the world (however, Uber is not considered as a disruptive 
innovation by Christensen). They suggest that the market concentration, the regulatory 
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system, the offering diversification and the culture of a country, can play a key role in 
explaining the different patterns observed. Corsi and Di Minin (2014) add a geographical 
dimension to the theory by relating disruptive innovation to the case of emerging economies. 
No firm-specific factors are considered 
The disruptive innovation theory makes no link with firm-specific factors, and in particular 
with the resource and competence approach which is dominant in strategic management and 
in the analysis of technologies (i.e. the distinction between competence-destroying 
technologies and competence enhancing technologies by Tushman and Anderson (1986)). 
Christensen argues that:” A primary conclusion of this paper is that when significant 
customers demand it, sufficient impetus may develop so that large, bureaucratic firms can 
embark upon and successfully execute technologically difficult innovations-even those that 
require very different competencies than they initially possessed “(Christensen and Bower, 
1996, p. 199). (Actually, it is one of the reasons he made instead a distinction between 
disruptive and sustaining innovation) 
Contrary to Christensen, all the authors we have cited before outline the critical role of 
resources and competences in explaining why incumbents fail or not when faced with 
disruptive innovations (and why a firm should or not adopt or develop a disruptive 
innovation). 
2.4 An eclectic framework for analyzing disruption 
Following our literature review on DI theory, we have designed an eclectic framework for 
analyzing disruptions, that integrates Christensen’s theory in a broader framework. The main 
characteristics of this framework is that it takes into account the external context -such as the 
level of competition before entry or regulatory factors-, as well as internal factors –in 
particular the resources and competences of the parent company of the new entrant ( Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
This framework (Table 2) also considers a broader definition of disruption by adopting 
Danneels (2006) definition that an innovation is disruptive when it changes the bases of 
competition by changing the performance metrics along which firms compete. We also add a 
distinction between changing the performance metrics at the market level (i.e. product 
attributes), at the firm level (change of strategic stance, i.e., from differentiation to cost), or at 
the industry level (i.e., the whole industry adopts changed strategic performance metrics). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3 Case studies 
3.1 Free Mobile1 
External factors 
The main catalyst of the entry of Free Mobile has been regulatory.  
Firstly, it has been made possible by the decision to grant a fourth mobile operator 
license due to the introduction of 3G technologies and the auction of related frequencies.  
Prior to this, the most recent entry in the mobile telecommunications market has been that of 
Bouygues Telecom, which has been awarded a 2G GSM license in 1996.  
                                                           
1
 The full case description can be found in Berne, Vialle and Whalley (2016) and in a forthcoming article. 
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Secondly, the entry of Free into the French mobile market was facilitated by the 
conditions set by the national regulator. It benefitted from a lower license cost as it only paid 
€240 million (for 5MHz) while its competitors paid €619 million for their license (but for 
15MHz).  Free was also allowed to sign an initial roaming agreement, which it did with 
Orange in 2011, that provided it to start operations with a full market coverage footprint. This 
had not been the case when Bouygues Telecom entered the market in 1996 – it had to slowly 
and painstakingly build its own network to add customers, but the market was still expanding 
at that time. Moreover, Free Mobile could pay reduced call termination charges compared to 
its competitors. In addition, Free also benefited from the introduction of number portability in 
France as well.  
The relatively low competitive pressure in France before the entry also made it easier. 
It was dominated by three incumbents following a policy of market share stabilization since 
the beginning of the 2000s: France Télécom (now Orange), SFR and Bouygues Telecom, with 
46.5%, 35.4% and 18.1% market share respectively at the end of 2008 (ARCEP, 2008)2. 
MVNOs had not been successful and were not in a position to challenge the incumbents. In 
2007, they only represented 5% of the market, compared to 35% in Germany and 16% in the 
UK (Quantifica, 2008). As a result, prices were also higher from 19% to 32% in France 
(depending on usage level) than the OECD average (OECD, 2009). The price difference was 
at maximum for the low-end market (low users). 
One consequence of this lack of competition was an identifiable presence of non-
consumers on the market that Free Mobile could target. The penetration rate end of 2011 was 
only 102% in France, compared to 140% in Germany, 115% in Spain, 152% in Italy and 
131% in UK3. 
Other general trends have created an advantageous context for innovative business 
models. The diffusion of mobile Internet allowed by both the introduction of 3G and 4G 
technologies, as well as of smartphones (the Iphone has been launched in 2007) was 
obviously a determining factor. It induced not only the rise new needs to satisfy, but also 
changing cost economics for operators. In particular, the 2010’s corresponded to a trend of 
fixed/mobile integration by operators (Idate). 
The market was also somehow over-served. The existence of numerous shops (owned 
by operators or other businesses) at nearly every street corner suggest a lack of rationalization 
of the distribution system and high distribution cost. It was becoming increasingly over-
serving as customers were increasingly used to buy online for other goods. 
Internal factors 
The main internal factor was the characteristics of the parent company, Iliad. Illiad has been 
an innovative ISP founded by a visionary leader who has successfully entered and disrupted 
the French fixed Internet market by being the first to introduce low-priced double and triple-
pay packages (Daidj and Vialle, 2011). In addition to its visionary and charismatic leader, this 
ISP brought its subsidiary Free Mobile significant resources and competences. From a 
technical point of view it had a significant know-how in managing telecommunications 
networks and services, and owned a modern core network infrastructure. From a market point 
of view, it had a significant installed base of 4 849 000 customers4, with a market share of 
                                                           
2
 Actually the three operators have been fined in 2005 for anticompetitive behaviour. Collectively the fines 
amounted to €534 million – Orange France paid €256 million, SFR €220 million and Bouygues Télécom €58 
million (Autorité de la concurrence, 2005). 
3
 https://www.arcep.fr/fileadmin/reprise/publications/chiffres-cle/chiffres-cle-2011-juin2012.pdf 
4
 https://www.iliad.fr/finances/2012/CP_080312.pdf 
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around 22%. It also had intangible market-based assets: established and recognized brand and 
a brand image of innovative and good value for money disruptor of established companies. 
Business model of the disruptor and offer characteristics 
The business model of Free Mobile is in line with the business model previously applied by 
Iliad to broadband Internet access. Firstly, this also offered low-priced plain integrative 
packages5 with “unlimited” features. The offerings were also “SIM only” without a handset 
subsidy, and there was neither contract duration obligation nor termination penalty. Free 
Mobile claimed its packages were twice as cheap as the current incumbent’s offering.6 These 
packages are attractive and easy to understand for consumers. They are also easy to 
communicate, to manage and bill, which, from the supplier’s perspective, is cost effective. 
Secondly, as in the case of Free, transactions are made nearly exclusively online, and the 
customer service is limited to and often delegated to users through various forums. This also 
helps keep costs low. It also illustrates the concept of “freedom” as customers are not bound 
by contractual limitations and/or handset subsidies. Finally, in both cases, Iliad took 
advantage of using another operator’s network during the launch phase, before switching 
progressively to its own infrastructure. 
So this business model and offer innovation fits the characterization of being 
“typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use”, made by 
Christensen, (1997, p.XV). 
Level of disruption 
The first observation is that Free Mobile effectively quickly gained market share and overtook 
Bouygues Telecom as 3rd operator in March 2015, 2 years and one quarter of operations only. 
Free Mobile managed to attract 2 million customers within only a month of launching its 
services. It has quickly and constantly improved its market share: 11.5% in 2012, 14.3% in 
2013, 16.4% in 2014, 17.7% in 2015, 18.5% in 2016.  
The offering and business model of Free Mobile is congruent Christensen’s (1997, 
2003) observation that disruptive innovations initially have a lower performance on the 
dimensions historically valued by mainstream customers in the core markets, but have a better 
performance on other dimensions. Free Mobile’s offering had a lower performance on 
distribution and customer service, as it was only available online and did not offer any 
handset subsidy. These two dimensions were traditionally perceived as important at the time 
of the launch. The network coverage was similar to other operators due to the roaming 
agreement with Orange. However, core service quality was initially lower than competitors at 
the beginning, due to various implementation issues and to the fast increase in number of 
customers. Free Mobile performed better on price, which is also a traditional dimension. It 
also relied on other dimensions than the other operators. It performed better on “freedom”: the 
offer was sim-only, without contractual limitations because of handset subsidies or other 
                                                           
5
 The first package included unlimited calls to 40 countries, unlimited SMS and MMS, and 3 GB of data, was 
proposed costing just €19.99 per month. Compared to previous packages offered by competitors (handset 
subsidy deducted), this package was around 50% cheaper. Another “social” package including 60 minutes of 
calls and 60 SMS for only €2 per month (that was later extended to 120 minutes of calls and unlimited SMS) was 
also launched. It was 80% cheaper than previous packages by competitors.Free mobile also demonstrated its 
strategy of harvesting it’s installed base of ADSL customers with special prices: €15.99 for the first package and 
€0 for the social package. http://www.clubic.com/telephone-portable/operateur-telephonie-mobile/free-
mobile/article-468124-4-forfait-free-mobile.html 
6
 http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xnkz0q_free-lancement-de-l-offre-mobile_news 
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reasons. It also offered unlimited features (voice, SMS), while other operators were initially 
offering post-paid subscription with a given number of minutes of use per month. 
Free’s business model and offering also fit the extended definition of disruptive 
innovation by Danneels (2006, p.249), as it “changes the bases of competition by changing 
the performance metrics along which firms compete”. As noted before, this definition is 
interesting because it considers the impact on the innovation on the whole industry. This is 
perceptible at the market level (product attributes) and at the strategic level. At the market 
level, it is remarkable that the “sim-only and no commitment” (and usually available only 
online) model has been widely adopted by competitors and is now dominant on the postpaid 
subscription market. End of 2017, it represented 68.8% of the total post-paid market and 
73.5% of the residential post-paid market7. At the strategic level, the resulting price and 
profitability decrease has led to a growing emphasis on cost control in the industry. Telecom 
operators and other firms have been led to reduce costs by rationalizing the distribution 
system and increasing the share of online sales. At the industry level, the necessity to reduce 
cost has spurred cooperation and mergers between operators. Mobile operators also made 
agreements to share infrastructure: SFR and Bouygues decided to share part of their networks 
in 2013 to reduce operational costs by between 20% and 25% (Abboud, 2014; Sahota, 2014). 
The (concluded or tentative) merger and acquisitions in this industry also reflect the necessity 
to reduce costs. It is also noticeable that SFR, the second French operator, has been acquired 
by Altice, a company heavily relying on LBOs for its acquisitions, which has therefore 
developed a particular competence in cost-reduction. 
Pattern of disruption 
The pattern that characterizes disruption according to Christensen (1997, 2003) is the 
following: a new entrant introduces an innovation on fringe markets that has a lower 
performance than the established offer on the dimensions historically valued by mainstream 
customers in the core markets, but has a better performance on other dimensions. After its 
introduction, it improves its performance on the dimensions valued by the main markets and 
eventually disrupts incumbents by conquering also the best customers. We did not find any 
precise information on adoption by market segments. It can be assumed that the 2 euro 
package reached customers of cheap 1 hour package and also non-consumers, and therefore 
consisted in low-end immediate encroachment and fringe market low end encroachment (the 
2 euro package). For the “unlimited” package, it is more difficult to establish. Previous 
comparable unlimited packages were obviously targeting the high-end market, which was 
offered a cheaper version by Free Mobile. However, it also allowed less affluent segments to 
get access to high level of consumption and to Mobile Internet.  
The fact that the penetration rate of non-commitment packages is higher on the 
residential market also suggests that the higher-end professional market was late in adopting 
this innovation. Actually, the offering by Free Mobile improved significantly over time, for 
example by increasing the data allowance to 20Go, then to 100Go and unlimited. I has also 
invested in 56 retail shops (for both fixed and mobile), as of May 20188. However, it does not 
compare with other operators, for example with Orange which had 661 shops in 20169. Free 
Mobile’s offerings are also not distributed by independent distributors. Free Mobile has also 
developed an offer of handsets sold on credit to compensate for the absence of subsidies. 
                                                           
7
 https://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=13858 
8
 http://www.free.fr/freecenter/. Accessed 4/05/2018. 
9
 https://www.lesechos.fr/14/03/2017/lesechos.fr/0211879844470_orange-accelere-la-reorganisation-de-ses-
boutiques-sur-2017.htm 
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In fact, the main pattern observed is that customers widely accepted to change their 
preferences to match the performance of the mix of attributes offered by Free mobile and that 
competitors quickly adopted the same type of mix along bundled handset traditional packages.  
Incumbents’ reactions 
According to Christensen (1997, 2003), when confronted with low-end disruption, 
incumbents tend to focus on the most attractive and profitable markets and invest in 
improving the performance of the dominant offering in order to satisfy the most demanding 
customers. Such a pattern could also be observed. None of the incumbents has followed Free 
Mobile in proposing a package as cheap as 2 euro per month. Bouygues Telecom also 
accelerated investment in 4G in order to compete more on service quality than on price. 
However, incumbents unanimously chose to cannibalize their own traditional business, by 
proposing the same type of offerings as Free Mobile. This is congruent with Christensen’s 
theory as their mainstream customers responded positively to Free Mobile’s offering. In this 
case, they did it by establishing separate brands and distribution channels, so that the sets of 
attributes for the two types of offers remained different. 
In summary, the main pattern observed is that customers widely accepted to alter their 
preferences to match the performance of the mix of attributes offered by Free mobile and that 
competitors quickly adopted the same type of mix along bundled handset traditional packages.  
3.2 Hutchison 3 UK 
External factors 
Regulation is at the heart of Hutchison’s entry into the UK mobile telecommunications 
market. In line with the desire of the European Union to increase the number of companies 
active in the market, more 3G licences than the number of existing 2G operators was offered 
in the UK. From the perspective of the government, the auction, which ran in April 2000, was 
a great success – it raised more than £22 billion, several times more than anticipated. The 
prices paid for the five licences was as follows: 
• Licence A: TIW, £4.38 billion 
• Licence B: Vodafone AirTouch, £5.96 billion 
• Licence C: BT, £4.03 billion 
• Licence D: One-2-One, £4 billion 
• Licence E: Orange, £4.09 billion (BBC, 2000) 
At the time of the auction, the market was divided between four mobile network 
operators: BT Cellnet, One-2-One, Orange and Vodafone. At the end of the 1Q00, there was 
27.196 million mobile subscribers (Global Mobile, 2000). The subscribers were shared 
between the four operators as follows:  
• BT Cellnet – 7.407 million subscribers (27.24%) 
• One-2-One – 5.018 million subscribers (18.45%) 
• Orange – 5.980 million subscribers (21.99%) 
• Vodafone – 8.791 million subscribers (32.32%) 
Interestingly, mobile number portability was launched in the UK in January 1999 (UK 
Mobile Number Portability Operator Steering Group, 2009). This allowed customers of one 
mobile operator to take their number with them when they moved to another operator, thereby 
reducing switching costs within the marketplace. Significantly, the mandated time to switch a 
consumer from one operator to another has changed over the years. Not only has an Ofcom 
review questioned the whole process (Ofcom, 2009), giving rise to changes, but an industry 
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body has sought to ensure a smooth and efficient process (UK Mobile Number Portability 
Steering Group, 2017). As a consequence, the time taken for consumers to churn between 
operators has substantially declined, thereby, in theory, reducing the barriers to switching 
present in the market.  
Around the turn of the millennium there was discussion in the UK regarding national 
roaming.10 After the initial set of proposals suggested by the regulator were objected to by 
both One-2-One and Orange, Oftel successfully persuade both O2 and Vodafone to offer 
national roaming. Hutchison signed a national roaming agreement with O2, thereby gaining 
national coverage while it built out its own infrastructure. Just a few years later, Ofcom, 
which had replaced Oftel as the telecommunications regulator, sought to remove the 
obligation of Vodafone and O2 to offer national roaming to Hutchison on their 2G networks. 
It was suggested that commercial means would deliver the necessary roaming agreements to 
Hutchison. Ofcom delayed its decision until Hutchison had agreed its new contract, which 
saw, in May 2006, Orange replace O2 as its national roaming partner for those parts of the UK 
where it did not have its own infrastructure (Sutherland, 2011). 
In late 2007, Hutchison formed an infrastructure sharing joint venture – Mobile 
Broadband Network Limited (MBNL) – with T-Mobile (TeleGeography, 2008a). Through 
this joint venture, both companies would enhance their 3G coverage while reducing their 
associated costs with the savings being suggested at around £2 billion over a 10-year period. 
It would also appear that the joint venture help Hutchison speed up the pace at which its 
network was rolled out, as the company installed its 10,000th base station in January 2010 
(TeleGeography, 2010a). With the merger of T-Mobile and Orange UK to create Everywhere 
Everything (EE), the number of base stations operated by MBNL was expected to increase 
though the company itself would remain as a 50/50 partnership between Hutchison and EE 
(TeleGeography, 2010b).  
Beginning in late 2008, MBNL has signed a series of contracts with Ericsson which 
sees this manage the 3G infrastructure of the joint venture (TeleGeography, 2008b). This saw 
employees from the T-Mobile being transferred to Ericsson, and the decommissioning of 
around 5,000 overlapping cell sites. The contract was extended in 2015 and 2017 
(TeleGeography, 2015). 
Given the significant role that spectrum plays in shaping the competitiveness of a 
mobile operator, Hutchison has twice intervened in the awarding of licences. In late 2012 
Hutchison threatened to leave the UK if it was not treated favourably in the forthcoming 4G 
licence (Cellular News, 2012). This, of course, did not happen but it is symptomatic of an 
increasing acrimonious and fraught debate that saw Everywhere Everything refarm existing 
spectrum to launch its 4G services before its rivals and the auction itself raise a lot less than 
anticipated (Curwen and Whalley, 2013). Hutchison also objected to the 5G auction proposed 
by Ofcom, arguing that ‘spectrum caps’ should be imposed on BT/EE and Vodafone to 
prevent them dominating the market (Fildes, 2017a). Although Ofcom did seek to impose 
‘spectrum caps’ on operators, these were objected to by Hutchison on the grounds that they 
were too high who eventually sought a judicial review of the auction (TeleGeography, 2017). 
Hutchison lost its legal challenge in December 2017, as well as its appeal in February 2018 
(Fildes, 2017b; TeleGeography, 2018). This allowed Ofcom to proceed with the auction in 
March / April 2018. 
Internal factors 
                                                           
10
 See, for example, Sutherland (2011) for further details. 
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The aforementioned purchase of a 3G licence by Hutchison marked its re-entry into the UK 
telecommunications market. After a brief and unsuccessful flirtation with a fixed wireless 
company called ‘Rabbit’, Hutchison successfully acquired a 2G licence and launched its 
services in April 1994 (Curwen and Whalley, 2008). This business was Orange, which was 
listed on the London stock-market just two years later in a move that valued the company at 
£2.45 billion (BBC, 2001).  
In October 1999, it emerged that Mannesmann had approached Hutchison regarding 
its 44.8% stake in Orange. Mannesmann subsequently bid $31 billion plus debt for Orange, 
with Hutchison taking a 10.2% stake in Mannesmann (Curwen and Whalley, 2004). As this, 
however, would change the ‘balance of power’ between Vodafone and Mannesmann in a 
string of joint ventures across Europe, Vodafone launched its own counter-bid for 
Mannesmann that initially valued the German company at €100 billion (Curwen and Whalley, 
2004). Vodafone did succeed in acquiring Mannesmann in a share-based merger valued at 
€178 billion. Orange was then sold to France Télécom in May 2000. 
As the consequence of these deals, Hutchison exited the European telecommunications 
market on arguably favourable terms. Rather than invest in cash in other lines of business,11 
Hutchison instead opted to return to the European mobile telecommunications market through 
the 3G licensing process (Curwen and Whalley, 2014). Significantly, this re-entry would see 
Hutchison do so without an installed 2G subscriber base but with a considerable amount of 
cash to fund its entry. 
Hutchison’s re-entry into the UK market initially took the form of a joint venture. 
After it has won the licence, Hutchison sold 35% of its UK operations to NTT DoCoMo and 
KPN Mobile (Hutchison Whampoa, 2001). This transaction raises a total of £2.1 billion (NTT 
DoCoMo, 2000). This relationship, however, soon turned sour. In early 2003 KPN refused to 
contribute additional funds to the joint venture (Leahy and Nuttal, 2003), and sold its stake in 
the company back to Hutchison in November of the same year for £90 million. NTT DoCoMo 
sold its stake for £120 million, though Hutchison did not complete the transactions to acquire 
outright control of its UK operations until 2005 (Lau, 2005). 
Business model of the disruptor and offer characteristics 
In essence, the business model of Hutchison is characterised by cheaper prices and enhanced 
(larger) bundle components. Thus, Hutchison was able to attract customers through charging 
customers similar or lower prices as other mobile operators while providing them with more 
minutes, SMS etc. Similar to other mobile operators, Hutchison sold via third party retailers 
like Carphone Warehouse as well as through its own retail stores. 
It has been suggested that over time the business model of Hutchison has changed. In 
early 2016, one commentator noted that while Hutchison may have been a disruptor in the 
past, this was no longer the case (Williams, 2016). Hutchison withdrew its unlimited data 
tariffs in 2014 in anticipation, it was suggested, of the pressures this would place on its 
spectrum. If this is a correct assessment, then it is perhaps unsurprising. Unlike some 
European countries, the UK mobile market is characterised by the presence of several 
innovative and price sensitive mobile virtual network operators (MVNO).12 These either 
                                                           
11
 As befits a conglomerate, Hutchison Whampoa is present in a range of different markets such as infrastructure, 
retailing and property. A recent reorganisation saw the consolidation of variously separate but related businesses 
into CK Hutchison, a company listed in Hong Kong but domiciled in the Cayman Islands. 
12
 In January 2017, it was claimed that Tesco Mobile had 4.6 million subscribers (Grant Thornton, 2017. This is 
considerably larger than the next two largest MVNO: it was reported that Virgin Mobile had 3 million 
subscribers while Giffgaff had 2 million customers. 
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compete on the basis of a well-known brand (e.g., Tesco Mobile), bundling (e.g., Virgin 
Mobile) or by focusing on a niche market (e.g., giffgaff). While they pay for access to 
spectrum provided by a licence holder, they do not have to make significant infrastructure 
investment which, among other things, reduces their costs and enables them to compete on 
prices.  
But Hutchison is not a MVNO. It has acquired licences for three successive 
generations of mobile technologies, paying a total of £4,756 million.13 In addition, Hutchison 
was required to roll-out is network across the UK to meet coverage obligations and then 
invest in the recruitment of customers through, for instance, subsidising hand-set costs. 
Without an existing 2G-based customer base to fund both the acquisition of spectrum and the 
subsequent development of the business, Hutchison needs to attract subscribers. To attract 
subscribers, Hutchison drew on funds from its parent company (Curwen and Whalley, 2014) 
and priced more competitively – that is, lower – than the other network operators. This starkly 
contrasts with the other network operators in the UK who could draw on their existing 
subscriber base to fund their expansion into 3G etc. Given the tensions that Hutchison faces it 
is, therefore, no surprise that its competitive focus has changed over time. 
Level of disruption 
Table 3 charts the growth of Hutchison over a number of years. The first point that can be 
made, is that Hutchison reported just over 10 million active customers in 2017. While this 
may sound like a large number, it is worth noting that it is considerably less than Vodafone 
UK, which has 17 million subscribers (Vodafone, 2018) and is the smallest of the other three 
operators in the UK. Hutchison is, in other words, the smallest of the four network operators 
in the UK. The relative position of Hutchison as the smallest of the four operators does not 
change when the number of registered customers is taken into account.14 Thus, while it has 
been able to grab market share, as demonstrated by its continued ability to attract subscribers, 
it has not been able to do to the extent that it has overtaken one of its rivals. 
[Insert Table 3 about here]  
As Hutchison has not been able to disrupt the market through organic growth, it 
sought to so through acquiring a rival. In January 2015 Hutchison entered into talks to acquire 
O2 from its parent company Telefonica in a deal valuing it at as much as £10.25 billion 
(Curwen and Whalley, 2016). To help persuade the European Commission to approve the 
purchase, Hutchison made a series of commitments including not raising prices for five years 
as well as agreeing to invest £5 billion over the same period. In May 2016, however, the 
European Commission rejected the purchase, arguing that it would have harmed innovation, 
reduced choice and resulted in prices increasing (European Commission, 2016). It is worth 
noting that if the deal had been approved, it would have changed the market structure: 
Hutchison/O2 would have become the largest company in the market, followed by EE and 
then Vodafone. 
Secondly, Hutchison has increased its revenues. 2010 was the first year that Hutchison 
separated out its revenues by country. In this year, Hutchison reported revenues of £1,404 
                                                           
13
 Hutchison paid £4,380 million for its 3G license, compared to £225 million for 4G and just £151 million for 
its 5G spectrum. 
14
 According to the company’s 2017 annual report, the number of registered customers in the UK was 12.7 
million. This is considerably more than the number of active customers of just over 10 million. While the gap 
between registered and active contract-based subscribers is relative small – 6.946 million cf. to 6.823 million – it 
is substantially wider for pre-paid – 5.664 million cf. 3.247 million (CK Hutchison, 2018). 
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million in the UK and has managed,15 perhaps surprisingly, to generate more revenues in each 
of the subsequent years so that by 2017 revenues in the UK totalled £2,425 million. Between 
2010 and 2017 the growth between years was reasonably large, with the exception of 2013 to 
2014 when revenues increased by just £19 million. 
Thirdly, EBITDA has increased over the years. Proportionally this has changed, so 
that EBITDA is now around a third of revenues – this is a considerable improvement over 
2014, when EBITDA was around a quarter of revenues. This is, arguably, somewhat 
surprising given the constant decline in ARPU from 2010 to 2017. Having said this, 
Hutchison has grown its subscriber base faster than its APRU has declined and has been able 
to grow the proportion of ARPU accounted for by data.16  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Interestingly, while Hutchison’s ARPU has declined more or less consistently since 
2007, its performance is still better than the mobile industry as a whole. Indeed, it could be 
argued that Hutchison’s performance as measured by ARPU has been continuously and 
substantially better than the sector average – in 2016, for example, the sector reported an 
ARPU of £15.19 while Hutchison achieved £19.24.  
Patten of disruption 
As can be seen from above, Hutchison’s position within the UK market has changed over 
time. Initially it focused on offering services, often in the form of generous bundles compared 
to its rivals, that were competitively priced. A key issue behind this was Hutchison’s lack of 
an existing installed subscriber base that would fund its expansion into 3G, and the need to 
swiftly attract users to generate revenues.  
Over time, however, Hutchison’s strategy has subtly changed. While it has continued 
to emphasis bundles, adding in new features, the price differential with incumbents has 
declined, in part because they have lowered their own prices. The proportion of contract-
based subscribers in the UK mobile market as a whole has increased from 59.1% in 2013 to 
66% in 2016 (Ofcom, 2017), while the figure for Hutchison has fallen from 72% to 68.8% 
over the same period – see Table 3. This would suggest that Hutchison is not seeking to 
attract customers based on minimal commitment (that is, pre-pay) but instead on the features 
that it offers.  
Moreover, Hutchison would appear to be willing to provide a level of customer service 
that places it squarely between incumbent operators on the one hand and MVNO on the other 
(Ofcom, 2018).17 This could be interpreted as illustrating how Hutchison’s positioning within 
the market combines elements of the strategies adopted by both network operators and 
MVNO.  
Incumbent reaction 
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 Interestingly the annual report for 2011 restated the revenues for 2010, increasing the figure to £1,572 million 
(Hutchison Whampoa, 2012). On this increased amount of revenues, Hutchison reported EBITDA of £165 
million.  
16
 While Hutchison does not present the proportion of APRU accounted for by non-voice sources consistently, it 
is possible to see that this has changed over time. In 2010 non-voice sources accounted for 41% of APRU, 
whereas in 2012 this figure had grown to 48%. 
17
 For example, 1% of Giffgaff customers complained, compared to 7% of Vodafone’s and 3% of Hutchison’s. 
Furthermore, 60% of Giffgaff customers who complained where satisfied with the process, compared to 57% of 
Hutchison’s customers and 47% of those who subscribe to Vodafone.  
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Given the position of Hutchison between existing mobile network operators on the one hand 
and MVNO on the other, the reaction of the existing four players was arguably muted. They 
copied elements of Hutchison’s business model, such as lower prices and larger bundle 
components, but combined these with their inherent scale economies to enhance their 
competitiveness. The lower prices offered by Hutchison forced the other network operators to 
follow suit, a development that attracted negative comments from David Varney when he was 
chairman of mmO2.  
It could be argued that the reduction in prices brought about by Hutchison contributed 
to the decision of Orange to exit the UK market through merging with T-Mobile UK to create 
Everywhere Everything. At the time of the exit, some commentators noted their surprise that 
Orange was struggling to make a reasonable profit in the UK given its size. The merger 
created a substantially larger operator whose profitability would be boosted through scale 
economies and synergies. 
3.2 Case comparison 
Tables 4 and 5 summarise the material recounted in the previous two sub-sections. While 
there are some similarities between the two case study companies, it is also the case that 
differences exist as well. Both companies have also benefited from the increasing availability 
and popularity of the mobile Internet. A virtuous circle emerged, with greater online content 
encouraging consumers to purchase data that, in turn, encouraged content providers to go 
online. However, the two companies approached the greater popularity of the mobile Internet 
quite differently due to how and when they entered their respective mobile markets. 
 Free Mobile was able to draw on and leverage the resources and market position of its 
parent company as it entered the French mobile market. Of particular importance was Free’s 
existing customer base, which Free Mobile could target in its marketing campaigns and 
profitably attract through low cost service offerings. In contrast, Hutchison could draw on the 
resources of its parent company to fund its expansion in the UK, but because it lacked an 
existing customer base its strategy was driven by the need to attract as many consumers as 
fast as possible. This inevitably lent itself to a price-oriented entry into the market.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The entry of Free Mobile and Hutchison was facilitated by developments in their 
respective regulatory environments. In the case of Free Mobile, the lower license cost 
facilitated its entry into the market the UK auction was less favourable as the cost of the 
licence was substantial. The expansion of both companies was facilitated by national roaming, 
with Hutchison also benefiting from its infrastructure joint-venture that reduced the cost of 
rolling out its infrastructure nationwide. 
Although the strategies of both companies have changed over time, this has arguably 
been more extensive for Hutchison than it has for Free Mobile. Hutchison has moved from 
being competing solely on price to instead emphasising the services that it offers. While its 
initial focus did result in its rivals reducing their prices and amending the components of the 
bundles that they offer, it has not been able to attract enough subscribers to overtake 
Everywhere Everything, O2 or Vodafone. It has remained, unlike Free Mobile, the smallest 
network operator throughout the whole period it has been active in the market.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 Another significant difference between the French and British mobile 
telecommunication markets is the key role played by MVNO in the latter. The competitive 
threat provided by MVNO in the UK is multi-faceted; Virgin Mobile is integral to the quad-
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play of Virgin Media, while Tesco Mobile competes on brand and price, Lebara Mobile on 
overseas tariffs. When combined with the rivalry of the network operators, the competitive 
landscape in the UK is arguably more diverse than it is in France.   
As Hutchison has become more mainstream over time, Free Mobile appears to have 
permanently changed the nature of competition within the French market. Not only have its 
rivals adopted some elements of the business model of Free Mobile, but consumers also 
appear to be willing to accept how Free delivers its services. The disruptive impact of Free 
appears to be more extensive and long lasting than it has been for Hutchison. This may help 
explain why Free has been able to overtake rivals in the market, while Hutchison has not – 
quite simply, the disruptive nature of Free contains to make its service attractive to 
consumers, whereas the increasingly mainstream stance of Hutchison results in a less 
attractive set of services in the UK market. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored what is meant by ‘disruption’ and found that although this 
issue has been extensively discussed in the literature, a lack of clarity and consensus can be 
observed. Disruption is multi-faceted, illustrating its complexity. To explore how disruption 
occurs within a regulated industry such as telecommunications, a framework based on the 
literature was developed and then applied to two companies that have been labelled as 
disruptive: Free Mobile in France and Hutchison in the UK.  
Through applying this framework, it has been possible to identify a series of 
similarities and differences in the disruptive impact of the two companies. While regulation 
has played a key role for both companies, the specific set of circumstances faced by Free 
Mobile and Hutchison were different, and this has shaped their strategies. These strategies are 
not the same, with Free Mobile building on the success of its parent company to sufficiently 
grow to overtake one its incumbent rivals and Hutchison becoming more mainstream over 
time while remaining the smallest network-based operator in the UK. 
The framework has highlighted how disruption differs between markets. In doing so, it 
has illustrated its usefulness as an analytical tool. At the same time, however, the application 
of the framework demonstrates the difficulties of consistently applying it in different 
circumstances. While both the French and UK mobile telecommunication markets are subject 
to the same overarching EU derived regulatory framework, not only does its application differ 
but the markets are also different. The French and British markets have been disrupted, but 
not in the same way. Disruption is, therefore, context dependent and this complicates any 
attempt to meaningfully compare between countries. 
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Table 1: External and internal factors influencing disruption. (C) means it is a core component 
of Christensen’s theory. 
Characteristics Meaning 
External Factors 
Regulation Regulation may facilitate or hinder entry and disruption 
Competition level Low competition level facilitates entry and disruption 
Price level Initial high high price level facilitates entry and disruption, for example by a low-
cost model 
Significant nb.of non-users A significant number of non-users represents a potential market that the new 
entrant may tap (i.e. new market disruption (C)) 
Over-served market An over-served market may be encroached by offers with a lower performance 
on dimensions valued by the mainstream customers (C) 
Sustaining trends Changes in technology, consumption or social trends may provide a supportive 
background for disruption 
Internal Factors 
Resources and competences 
from parent company 
The resources and competences, developed by the parent company or the new 
entrant itself  through previous activities, can be valuable for the new activity (i.e. 
complementary assets). 
 
  
 23
Table 2: Characteristics and pattern of disruption. (C) means it is a core component of 
Christensen’s theory. 
Disruption characteristics Meaning 
Level The level of disruption can be assessed by the market share won during a given 
period of time, and the rank obtained by the new entrant. 
Business model and 
offering characteristics 
The characteristics of the business model and of the related offer. 
Fit “cheap, simple, etc..” 
definition 
Products based on disruptive innovations are often “typically cheaper, simpler, 
smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use” (Christensen, 1997, p.XV) 
Performance on 
mainstream dimensions 
Disruptive innovations often initially have a lower performance on dimensions 
valued by mainstream customers (C) 
Performance on other 
dimension 
Disruptive innovations often initially have a performance on other dimensions 
than the ones valued by mainstream customers (C) 
Changes the bases of 
competition by changing 
the performance metrics 
along which firms 
compete 
Market level: changes in product/service attributes. Strategic level: changes of 
strategic emphasis of firms. Industry level:  
Christensen’s pattern of 
disruption (from low-
end/new market to 
mainstream market)? 
New entrants often move from low-end/new market to mainstream market in 
order to be actually disruptive (C) 
Incumbents’ reaction Incumbents often choose to retreat from low-end markets, focus on the most 
attractive and profitable markets, and invest in improving the performance of the 
dominant technology in order to satisfy the most demanding customers (C). 
Pattern summary Each disruption may exhibit a specific pattern 
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Table 3: Performance of Hutchison 3 UK, 2010 - 2017 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue, £ million 1404 1787 1948 2044 2063 2195 2276 2425 
EBITDA, £ million - 191 281 417 547 686 719 702 
         
Registered customers, 000s 7426 8219 9052 9842 10286 10791 11409 12610 
         
Active customers, 000s - - - 7936 8414 8966 9179 10070 
Contract 000s - - - 5718 5931 6068 6320 6823 
Prepaid 000s - - - 2218 2483 2898 2859 3247 
         
Average revenue per user per month, £ 22.6 21.87 21.19 20.74 20.81 20.10 19.24 18.07 
         
 
Sources: assembled by the authors from successive annual reports of Hutchison Whampoa and CK Hutchison 
 
 25
Figure 1: Hutchison vs. sector ARPU, 2010-2016 (inclusive) 
 
Sources: successive annual reports of Hutchison Whampoa and CK Hutchison; Statista (2018) 
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Table 4: External and internal factors influencing disruption 
 
Characteristics Free Mobile Three UK 
External Factors 
Regulation Lower license cost, roaming 
agreement, lower call termination 
charges 
License reserved for new entrant, 
national roaming agreement 
Competition level Moderate. Only 3 Operators. Low 
MVNO presence 
High. 3 operators and active MVNO 
presence 
Price level High. + 19% to 32%/ OECD 2009 
average 
 
Significant nos. of non-
users 
Yes. -37%/Germany, -22%/UK in 
2011 
Yes 
Over-served market Yes (distribution) No 
Sustaining trends Mobile Internet diffusion, fixed-
mobile convergence 
Mobile Internet diffusion 
Internal Factors 
Resources and 
competences from parent 
company 
Visionary leader, telecommunications 
know-how, core network, installed 
base of customers (4.9 million), 
recognized brand, Innovative image 
Patient and supportive parent company 
willing to invest large amounts to fund 
development 
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Table 5: Characteristics and pattern of disruption 
Disruption characteristics Free Mobile 3 UK 
Level Fast market penetration: 14.3% in 2 years, 18.5% in 5 years. 3rd operators 
after 2 ¼ years. 
Slower growth than anticipated, remaining the smallest operator by 
subscribers throughout the period 
Business model and offering characteristics Sim-only, no contractual commitments, very cheap (around 50%) package 
with unlimited voice and SMS + data allowance, online only, minimal 
customer service 
Enhanced bundle allowances cf. to existing operators 
Fit “cheap, simple, etc..” definition Yes Yes 
Performance on mainstream dimensions Lower on distribution and customer service, no handset subsidy, initial lower 
service quality 
Initial lower service quality, ‘middle of the road’ customer service 
Performance on other dimension Higher performance on “freedom”: no contractual commitment, unlimited 
features 
 
Changes the bases of competition by changing 
the performance metrics along which firms 
compete 
Market level: no commitment packages dominate the post-paid market 
(68.8% after 5 years). Strategic level: lower prices and profits lead to cost 
control: HR reduction, distribution rationalization. Industry level: 
cooperation (network sharing) and restructuration 
Market level: data increasingly important, declining number of prepay 
connections. Strategic level: pricing to grow subscriber base results in a slow 
transition to profitability; larger bundle components cf. rivals. Industry level: 
co-operation in network sharing and roaming to reduce costs and enhance 
coverage; aggressive regulatory stance with regards to spectrum 
Christensen’s pattern of disruption (from low-
end/new market to mainstream market)? 
Partially: some clues of low-end and new market (non-consumers) but 
mainstream customers also adopted the offering early. No evidence of 
significant performance increase on previous main dimensions. 
Increasingly mainstream provider of services, but lacking critical mass 
Incumbents’ reaction Have left the very low-end market to FM. Some tentative in upgrading 
quality. Have massively adopted FM business model, but with separate 
brands. 
MVNO has emphasised price, while network operators have mimicked some 
aspects of bundling strategy  
Pattern summary Rather than FM improving performance on mainstream dimensions, 
consumers have adapted their preferences to FM’s set of attribute type. 
Incumbents have chosen to cannibalize themselves by marketing similar sets 
of attributes with separate brand 
3 UK has become increasingly mainstream, improving quality and customer 
service while leaving solely price based competition to MVNO 
 
 
